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1 Introduction
More than forty years ago, Kaldor (1961) singled out the constancy of the output-capital ratio
and the steady increase of the labor productivity as two of the main stylized facts characterizing
western industrialized economies. With medium run fluctuations, these facts have been
confirmed till the current years (see for example Romer 1989 and Evans 2000). Two questions
arise: first, why technical change is biased towards labor augmentation; second, what accounts
for the extent of labor productivity increases. The standard neoclassical growth model, though
compatible with these facts, provides no answer to each of the questions. Harrod neutrality is
assumed as the only kind of technical change compatible with the existence of steady states, and
the magnitude of the growth rate of technology is also a given.
Determining endogenously the rate of technical change in a model based on the neoclassical
theory of distribution was indeed problematic. Under perfectly competitive conditions, factors of
productions are paid according to their marginal productivities. This implies that under constant
returns to scale in labor and capital the whole product is just sufficient to pay their remuneration,
and nothing is left to reward the cost of introducing an innovation.
The endogenous growth literature has overcome this impasse. Leaving aside the human
capital and AK models and focusing on R&D driven technical change, two alternatives have
been explored. In the early 90s the abandonment of perfect competition and the introduction of a
degree of monopoly into growth models provided the rents necessary to justify a costly research
activity; models of horizontal (Romer 1987, 1990) and vertical (Grossman and Helpmann 1991,
Aghion and Howitt 1992) innovation have been developed by adopting this framework.
Abandoning the assumption of constant returns to scale in production while retaining perfect
competition provided a second option. Under decreasing returns to scale competitive firms earn
positive profits in equilibrium; such profits may be used to pay for the cost of innovation. Recent
contributions have developed this possibility (Hellwig and Irmen 2001, Irmen 2005). However,
the endogenous growth literature in its various forms simply assumed that innovations would
improve labor productivity thus neglecting (with the notable exception of Acemoglu 2002, 2003,
2007) the issue of the direction of technical change.Luca Zamparelli
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The idea that market mechanisms may influence the direction of change in technology traces
back at least to Hick’s (1932, pp. 124-5) suggestion that technical change would tend to
economize the factors becoming relatively expensive. Theorists of the 60s (von Weizsacker
(1962), Kennedy (1964), Samuelson (1965) and Drandakis and Phelps (1966)) formally
developed this intuition. In particular, this literature known as ‘induced innovation’ introduced
an innovation frontier to describe the trade-off between growth rates of labor and capital
productivity available to the firm. Figure 1 represents the original formulation of the innovation
possibility frontier put forward by Kennedy as the function ( ) g    , where  is the rate of
growth of capital productivity and  is the rate of growth of labor productivity; all the points
below the curve represent couples of rates of growth of labor and capital productivity freely
available to the firm. Firms are assumed to choose a combination of factors productivity
augmentation in order to maximize the current rate of unit cost reduction given factors
employment and prices. The maximization problem solution implies that the direction of
technical change depends on factors shares: the market economy has an endogenous tendency to
save the factor of production whose share is increasing. Provided that the elasticity of
substitution between labor and capital is smaller than one, the economy converges to a steady
state equilibrium with constant factors shares and pure labor-augmenting technical progress. In
turn, Harrod neutral technical change finds an explanation rooted in the economic behavior of
firms. From an empirical point of view, the induced innovation hypothesis seems to be
confirmed by, or at least is consistent with, the positive reaction of labor productivity growth to
an increase in the labor share that seems to characterize most industrialized countries (see
Gordon 1987, Barbosa-Filho and Taylor 2006).Direction and Intensity of Technical Change: a Micro Model
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Figure 1 Innovation possibility frontier
In these models however, the position of the innovation possibility frontier was assumed to
be given so that the steady state growth rate of labor productivity was necessarily exogenous.
Working within R&D models based on imperfect competition Acemoglu (2002, 2003, 2007)
has been able to endogenize at the same time the direction and the intensity of technical change. I
attempt a similar procedure in a model that combines neoclassical elements, such as perfect
competition and convexity of individual costs structure, with classical ones such as the division
in classes (workers, capitalists and entrepreneurs) and a non-clearing labor market. While the
interest rate brings about the equality between demand and supply in the loanable funds market,
the employment rate depends only on technology and on the level of productive capacity. In the
spirit of the induced innovation literature the existence of a possibility frontier is assumed;
however, it is not given exogenously. Its position depends on firms’ investment, and innovating
is therefore costly: the model provides a microfoundation of both the direction and the size of
innovation.Luca Zamparelli
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A steady state solution with constant output-capital ratio, labor productivity growth, factors
shares and employment ratio is derived. The main finding is that, contrary to Acemoglu’s results,
fiscal policy is effective: an increase in subsidies to R&D increases steady state per capita
growth, wage share and employment ratio.
2 The Model
2.1 Individual firm
We start by considering the static problem of the firm at time t . Firms produce a homogeneous
output and are price takers; at time t each firm faces the problem of choosing the level of
capacity
i t x
 , and the one period growth rates of augmentation of capital and labor efficiency
( )
i t i t  
   which will determine the firm’s technology at time 1 t   At 1 t  , given capacity and
the state of technology the firm will hire the profit maximizing mass of labor
1 i t n
   Output at
1 t  is given by the Leontief production function
1 1 min[ (1 ) (1 ) ]
i t i t t i t t i t i t Y x b a n  
          
where t b and t a are respectively the level of efficiency reached by capital and labor in the
economy at time t . Notice that t b and t a are not indexed by i since innovations are assumed to
be freely available after one period of monopoly.Direction and Intensity of Technical Change: a Micro Model
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Technology characterization requires the specification of the cost function of productive
capacity and innovation. In order to increase capacity from 1 t x  to t x (I assume no depreciation)
the firm has to invest the amount 1 ( ) t t K x x   of output. The innovation technology is such that
by investing ( ) i V Y     units of output each firm can improve the technology from ( ) t t b a  to
( (1 ) (1 )) t t b a      . The function V is intended to allow the technological frontier to become
endogenous. The technological frontier represents the tradeoff between the possibility of
augmenting capital or labor efficiency; it is usually assumed to be exogenous and given at a
certain level. With the aid of the cost function introduced we can represent a whole family of
technological frontiers as the level curves associated to different levels of R&D spending. Figure
Figure 2 Innovation cost functionLuca Zamparelli
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2 shows the level curves of the cost function of innovation associated to the level of investment
0 K , 1 K .
In order to work out the solution to our problem we make the following assumptions:
1 1 1 ( ) ( ) t t t t t K x x x x x       
(.)  is twice continuously differentiable with:
   
   
1 1
2 2
(1) (1) 0, / , / 0
, , ,
t t t t
i i
x x x x
V Y YC    
 

         
   
(.) C is twice continuously differentiable with:
(0 0) 0, ( ) 0 C C       otherwise
(0 0) 0 ( ) 0 C C         otherwise
2 ( ) D C    is positive definite.
Notice that the cost function for innovation is not defined in the negative quadrant as past
technologies are freely available to the firm. Moreover, both for capacity and innovation, we
have assumed zero marginal cost at the origin to assure positive investment. As usual in the
literature of investment cost, the assumption of convexity can be justified through the idea of
adjustment costs, and it is necessary in order for the static optimization problem to be well-
defined. Moreover, the cost functions of innovation and capacity are scaled respectively to initial
output and to initial capacity to avoid that the unit cost of increasing productivity or capacity
would asymptotically tend to zero.
Since production emerges only at period 1 t  , firms have to borrow at time t to pay for the
cost of investment in capacity and innovation; they will pay the interest rate t i upon the amount
of output borrowed.
Profit maximization requires
1 1 1 i t i t t t n x b a
       so that the profit maximization problem
at t isDirection and Intensity of Technical Change: a Micro Model
7
1 1 1 , ,
1 1 1 1
[ (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )]
(1 ) [1 (1 ) ] (1 ) ( ) ( )
it it it
e
t i t t it t it it t t it it i t i t i t x
e
it t it t it t t t i t it it i t i t i t
Max Y w bx a i V Y i K x x
b x w a i bx C x x x
      
    
     
       
            
                     
with (0 1]    being the discount factor. Notice that today’s profit maximizing plan depends
on the expected level of the wage rate as today’s choice of capacity in fact fixes the amount of
labor the firm will decide to hire in the next period.
Given the assumptions on V and K the maximand function is strictly concave and the first
order conditions are sufficient and necessary for a maximum:
1 1 (1 ) [1 (1 ) ] (1 ) ( ) 0
e
it t t it t t i t i t
it




   
                
(1)
1 1 [1 (1 ) ] (1 ) ( ) 0
t
e
t it t it t t t i t it it
it
bx w a i b x C    

  
              
(2)
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1 1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) 0
t
e
t it it t it t t t i t it it
it
b x w a i bx C     

  
              
(3)
Let us define the labor share as  Then t t t w a   and 1 1
e e
t t t w a     is the expected labor
share. Notice that the labor productivity level considered to calculate the expectation on
tomorrow’s labor share is today’s productivity t a . It is so as firm i will have a one period
monopoly over the technology it develops and, at the same time, firms do not take into account
the possibility that their own behavior might be adopted by the rest of firms population. 1
e
t  




[1 (1 ) ] 1
(1 ) (1 )
1
1 (1 ) ( )




it t it t
e
w a it t it it it
e w a






    
   


               
 

   
 
 
or in a simpler fashion
1
1
( ) 1 1
1 ( )
e
it it it t it
e





    
   






The observation of (4) confirms the result of the directed technical change literature. An
increase in the wage share has to be accommodated by increasing labor productivity more thanLuca Zamparelli
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capital productivity. There is a tendency in the market system to introduce a bias in the technical
change towards the factor whose share is increasing. A sufficient condition for this result is
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) it it it it it it it it C C C C                  . The condition requires that the level
curves of the cost function representing the trade-off between capital and labor augmentation
corresponding to different levels of R&D spending be concave: i.e. it is analogous to the
assumption of concavity of the innovation possibility frontier
1.
2.2 Closure of the model
In order to move to the macroeconomic equilibrium we assume a representative firm. Along
classical lines it is also assumed that workers consume all their wages and capitalists save their
whole income and offer it on the financial market to earn the interest rate i.
For a given expectation on the wage share 1
e
t   and interest rate t i the firm’s maximization
problem determines the equilibrium values:
1 1 1 1 1 { ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )}
e e e e
t t t t t t t t t t t t x i i i n i      
   
           
Solving for the equilibrium of the economic system at a certain point in time requires that
we specify the equilibrium conditions for the interest rate and the wage rate, together with the
way expectations on the wage rate are determined.
The role of the interest rate is to clear the output market. It will assume the value at which
the excess of output over workers’ consumption (the economy’s saving) is fully invested in
either innovation or capacity:
1
1 1 1 1 1 ( ( ) ( ) ) ( ( ) )
e e e t t
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t
bx
Y bx w V i i Y K x i x
a
    
      
               (5)








C d C d C k
d C
d
C k C C C C
d






     










        
   

  Direction and Intensity of Technical Change: a Micro Model
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Current production is consumed either as workers’ consumption or as investment in
innovation and capacity.
Since labor demand at a certain point in time is determined by the previous period profit
maximizing investment in capacity and technical change there is no guarantee that the labor
market will clear. In turn: 1 t t t t Lbx a   , where t L is the (inelastic) labor supply at time t . Let us
assume that labor market tightness influences the expectation on next period wage rate, and let
such tightness be measured by the employment rate 1 ( ) t t t t t t t v n L bx a L      . Then,
expectations on the wage rate can be modeled according to
1 ( )
e
t t t w f w v    (6)
with
0
t t w v f f   
Finally, we impose that in equilibrium expectations are correct
1 1
e
t t w w

   (7)
For any initial condition
0 0 1 a b x
                
2 we have six conditions (1), (2), (3), (5), (6), (7) to
determine a sequence of temporary equilibrium values for six endogenous variables
1 1 ( )
e
t t t t t t x w w i           Notice the different nature of the prices of labor and capital. The interest
rate adjusts instantaneously to clear the market of loanable funds while the wage rate is
determined by its past history and the disequilibrium on the labor market in the previous period.
2.3 Dynamical System
The evolution of the equilibrium can be represented as a system of difference equations in the
three state variables ( ) t t t b v     If we define the function 1 ( ) ( ) t t t t t t h v w w f w v w       , the
expected wage share can be expressed as 1 ( )
e
t t t h v     . From equation (2 bis), the interest rate
can be obtained as a function of the three state variables: ( ) t t t t i i b v 
    . In turn we have the
following system:
2To keep notation consistent I have denoted 1 x the initial capacity the representative firm is endowed with at the





(1 ( ( ) )
(1 ( ( ) ))( ( ( ) ))(1 ( ( ) ))(1 )
( )1 ( ( ) )
t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t L
t t t t t t t
b b h v i
v v h v i x x h v i h v i g
h v h v i
 
    
   
 






       
  
(8)
where L g is the exogenous rate of population growth. The system determines the evolution of
the capital productivity, employment ratio and labor share. In the process, the remaining
endogenous variables ( ) t t t t i x  
       are determined as functions of the state variables and the
parameters describing technology and the labor market.
2.3.1 Steady state















ss ss ss ss
x ss L
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where x g is the steady state growth rate of capacity. Using (9) and dividing (5) by t Y the
equilibrium conditions can be rewritten as:
[1 ] (1 ) ((1 ) ( )) ss ss ss L ss b i g h v 
      (1 bis)
(1 ) ( )[1 ] (1 ) (0 ( ) 1)
L ss ss ss ss g h v i C h v
        (2 bis)
(1 ) (1 ) (0 ( ) 1)
L ss ss ss g i C h v
       (3 bis)
((1 ) ( ))









     (5 bis)
Solving for (1 ) ss i  in (3 bis) and for ss b dividing (1 bis) by (2 bis) and by plugging
(1 ) ss i  and ss b back in (1 bis) we findDirection and Intensity of Technical Change: a Micro Model
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(0 ( ) 1) ( )




C h v h v






    
The steady state value for the labor share is always economically meaningful being positive
and smaller than one. Using ss  in (3 bis) and 1 (bis) we obtain:
(1 ) ( )




ss C h v C h v h v i
 

      
and
(1 ) ( ) ((1 ) ( ))
(0 ( ) 1)
L ss L ss
ss
g h v g h v
ss C h v b

   
  
Finally, substituting for ss b and ss  into (5 bis) determines implicitly ( ) ss h v .
(0 ( ) 1) ( )
1
(0 ( ) 1) (0 ( ) 1) ( )
(0 ) (1 ) ( )
(0 ( ) 1)





L ss L ss
C h v h v
C h v C h v h v
C g h v
C h v







    
  
   
  
(10)
After ss ss ss b v    and ss i have been determined, (9) solves for ( ) 1 ss ss h v    and
(1 ) ( )
x L ss g g h v   . Notice also that since 1 (1 ) t t t t Y x b     the steady state growth rate of
output is
L y x ss g g g      , i.e. the equality between the warranted and natural growth rates.
Notice however that the growth rate of labor productivity is endogenous both as it is determined
as the profit maximizing decision of the firm, and, as we will see in Section 4, as it can be
affected by the action of the policy maker.
Using the definition of profits we can calculate the steady state level of the profit rate as:
1 ( ) [(1 )(1 ) (1 )( )] ss t t ss ss x ss ss ss r x b g i C b               , which, given (5 bis), implies
(1 )( ) ss ss ss x ss r b g i      . The gross profit rate of the economy, (1 ) ss ss x b g    , is divided
between the remuneration of the interest on saving and the residual compensation of the
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs profits are positive if and only if the rate of growth of the economy
exceeds the interest rate. This possibility arises from the restriction to entry in production. InLuca Zamparelli
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fact, as it is customary in general equilibrium analysis (see MacKenzie, 1959), equilibrium extra-
profits can be conceived of as a rent rewarding the fixed factor entrepreneurship.
3 Discussion of the Model
Several papers in recent years have provided microfoundations of growth models under perfectly
competitive conditions. I have adopted a framework similar to the one developed by Bester and
Petrakis (2003), Hellwig and Irmen (2001), and Irmen (2005) which assumes perfect competition
and strictly convex investment cost in capacity and innovation. In these models the assumption
of convexity is fundamental as increasing marginal costs provide the equilibrium inframarginal
rents necessary to pay for the cost of innovation. At the same time, even when the innovation
possibility frontier is exogenous and only the direction of technical change is chosen by the firm
(see Funk, 2002), convexity is necessary to assure that the individual firm’s production plan be
bounded. In my model, since no free entry is assumed, there exist positive profits part of which
can be used to finance the cost of innovation. Therefore convexity simply guarantees that the
investment plan is finite.
Also like in Hellwig and Irmen (2001) and Bester and Petrakis (2003) I assume Leontief
production function. However, contrary to those models, even though at a given point in time
there is zero substitutability between factors, by directing innovation towards either factors of
production firms can use technical change to substitute one factor to the other. Much in the spirit
of Kaldor’s (1957) suggestion to abolish the neoclassical distinction between movements along
the production function due to capital deepening, and shifts of the production function due to
technical change, technical progress is required to change factors proportion. A similar idea has
been developed by Foley and Michl (1999) and Michl (1999) through the concept of fossil
production function. They show that a pattern resembling a smooth neoclassical production
function with capital deepening can be obtained as the trace of successive adoptions of labor
saving and capital using technical change. My model differ from their approach as firms do not
face an exogenous labor-saving capital-using evolution of technology but choose both the size
and the direction of innovation.
The dynamical system of employment rate, wage share and capital productivity described in
(8) can be seen as a Goodwin (1967) growth model generalized to encompass the possibility ofDirection and Intensity of Technical Change: a Micro Model
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endogenous direction of technical change. It has been first studied by Shah and Desai (1981) and
later analyzed by van der Ploeg (1987), Thompson (1995), Foley (2003) and Julius (2005)
among the others. They have shown that, once coupled with the innovation possibility frontier,
the cyclical behavior of the Goodwin model collapses to a stable steady state with constant factor
shares, capital productivity and growth rate of labor productivity. Under one respect my system
is fundamentally different. Since the innovation possibility frontier is endogenous the steady
state productivity growth and income distribution are not uniquely pinned down by the
innovation technology but they depend on the incentive to accumulate. As we see in the next
Section 4 this opens up the possibility for policy action.
4 Policy Analysis
The per-capita growth rate of the economy in the standard neoclassical model is exogenous. This
exogeneity is to be understood in a twofold way. On the one hand, the growth rate is exogenous
as technical change is not the outcome of profit-maximizing agents’ decision. On the other hand,
it is independent of the propensity to save and, in turn, it cannot be affected by the action of the
policy maker.
Section 2 developed the ‘descriptive’ model where growth is endogenous as it is the result of
firms’ investment in innovation. This section shows that, in our model, growth is endogenous as
the policy maker can affect the steady state per capita growth by means of tax/subsidy to
investment in innovation and capital accumulation.
Let  be the tax/subsidy rate on investment in R&D, and let  be the tax/subsidy rate on
capacity investment. ( )    will represent a tax if 0     , and a subsidy in case 0     
Subsidies on investment are financed through lump sum taxes on capitalists’ saving;
analogously, in case of a positive tax rate, taxes on investment are transferred to capitalists. The
fiscal budget remains unaffected. Let 1 A    and 1 B    , the model (1 bis - 5 bis)
becomes
[1 ] (1 ) ((1 )(1 )) ss ss ss L ss b i B g  
       (1 tris)
(1 )(1 )[1 ] (1 ) (0 )
L ss ss ss ss g i AC
          (2 tris)Luca Zamparelli
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(1 ) (1 ) (0 )
L ss ss ss g i AC












    (5 tris)
where we used ( ) 1 ss ss h v     Notice that equation (5 tris) is not affected by the policy action:
a change in the cost of investment at the right hand side
( (0 ) ((1 )(1 )) ) ss L ss ss C g b           cancels out at the left hand side with an equivalent
change in the economy’s saving.
Proceeding analogously to what we did to find (10) we obtain:
(0 ( ) 1) ( )
1
(0 ( ) 1) (0 ( ) 1) ( )
(0 ) (1 ) ( )
(0 ( ) 1)





L ss L ss
C h v h v
C h v C h v h v
C g h v
C h v







    
  
   
  
(11)
In the attempt to prove our result let us start by considering the case where only innovation
is targeted by the policy maker. We set in turn 1 B  in (9). By totally differentiating and
rearranging we find
2
(1 )(1 ) ( (1 ) )(1 )(1 )
L ss ss L ss C g dA C A C C g
      
                         
2
2 2 ( )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
ss ss ss AC C C C C C C C C d
              
 

                            
where we used the fact that in steady state 0 d  
In turn, since the concavity of the isocosts of the innovation production implies
C C C C




 is given by (1 )
ss C C
     and
2      . Under such conditions a reduction in the cost of innovation fosters steady state per
capita growth
The subsidy to innovation also affects income distribution and employment. In steady state,
we haveDirection and Intensity of Technical Change: a Micro Model
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( ) 1 ss ss h v   
and
(0 )(1 )








   
 
     ;








C C C C C C d
d
C C







        
 
       
, by increasing the
steady state rate of growth of labor productivity, a subsidy to innovation raises the labor share
and the employment ratio.
Analogously, we can study the effect of a change in the subsidy to capital accumulation on
the steady state per capita growth rate. Since B enters equation (11) in exactly the same way as
1
A










 : reducing the cost of capital accumulation reduces steady state per
capita growth.
3
Our policy analysis has shown that, under plausible conditions, steady state per-capita
growth can be fostered both by subsidizing innovation and by taxing capital accumulation.
5 Conclusions
The paper provides a proposal to unify endogenous growth and induced innovation literature.
With firms allowed to choose both the direction and the size of innovation, the productivity










           
, with
0, 1     to assure strict convexity; and    
2 2 , , with , 0 C a c a c          , a symmetric positive
definite quadratic form. Under this assumption thesufficient conditions for a positive impact of an increase in subsidy to
R&D is always satisfied as  
2 2 2 2 2 2








      
  
  
         
                                   
, and
  1 0
ss C C c
       (where we used 0
ss   .Luca Zamparelli
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growth rate is not uniquely pinned down by technology. The policy maker is capable of affecting
the economy’s performance in terms of steady state growth and income distribution and
employment by subsidizing either innovation or capital accumulation.Direction and Intensity of Technical Change: a Micro Model
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